| The Experimental Approach to Free Will | The Experimental Approach to Free Will | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/2rogers.jpg | Katherin A. Rogers | Routledge | 2022 | Rogers canvases the literature critical of recent experiments
and adds new criticisms of her own. She shows why these
experiments should not undermine belief in human
freedom -- even robust, libertarian freedom. She identifies
ethical and practical problems facing the attempt to study
free will experimentally. She argues that even in the future
it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will
experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has
not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it
is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed
have freedom | https://www.routledge.com/The-Experimental-Approach-to-Free-Will-Freedom-in-the-Laboratory/Rogers/p/book/9781032194028 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=15 | |
| Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism | Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/1rogers.jpg | Katherin Rogers | Oxford University Press | 2015 | Katherin A. Rogers presents a new theory of free will, based on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury. We did not originally produce ourselves. Yet, according to Anselm, we can engage in self-creation, freely and responsibly forming our characters by choosing 'from ourselves' (a se) between open options. Anselm introduces a new, agent-causal libertarianism which is parsimonious in that, unlike other agent-causal theories, it does not appeal to any unique and mysterious powers to explain how the free agent chooses. After setting out Anselm's original theory, Rogers defends and develops it by addressing a series of standard problems levelled against libertarianism. These include the problem of 'internalism--in that an agent is not the source of his original motivations, how can the structure of his choice ground his responsibility?; the problem of Frankfurt-style counterexamples--Do we really need open options to choose freely?; and the problem of luck--If nothing about an agent before he chooses explains his choice, then isn't the choice just dumb luck? (The Anselmian answer to this perennial criticism is especially innovative, proposing that the critic has the relationship between choices and character exactly backwards.) Finally, as a theory about self-creation, Anselmian Libertarianism must defend the tracing thesis, the claim that an agent can be responsible for character-determined choices, if he, himself, formed his character through earlier a se choices. Throughout, the book defends and exemplifies a new methodological suggestion: someone debating free will ought to make his background world view explicit. In the on-going debate over the possibility of human freedom and responsibility, Anselmian Libertarianism constitutes a new and plausible approach. | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/freedom-and-self-creation-9780198743972 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=4 | |
| War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory | War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/2draper.jpg | Kai Draper | Oxford University Press | 2015 | Kai Draper begins his book with the assumption that individual rights exist and stand as moral obstacles to the pursuit of national no less than personal interests. That assumption might seem to demand a pacifist rejection of war, for any sustained war effort requires military operations that predictably kill many noncombatants as "collateral damage," and presumably at least most noncombatants have a right not to be killed. Yet Draper ends with the conclusion that sometimes recourse to war is justified. In making his argument, he relies on the insights of John Locke to develop and defend a framework of rights to serve as the foundation for a new just war theory. Notably missing from that framework is any doctrine of double effect. Most just war theorists rely on that doctrine to justify injuring and killing innocent bystanders, but Draper argues that various prominent formulations of the doctrine are either untenable or irrelevant to the ethics of war. Ultimately he offers a single principle for assessing whether recourse to war would be justified. He also explores in some detail the issue of how to distinguish discriminate from indiscriminate violence in war, arguing that some but not all noncombatants are liable to attack. | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/war-and-individual-rights-9780199388899?cc=us&lang=en& | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=3 | |
| An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy) | An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy) | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/3adams.jpg | Fred Adams (co-authored by Daniel Weiskopf) | Cambridge University Press | 2015 | Psychology aims to give us a scientific account of how the mind works. But what does it mean to have a science of the mental, and what sort of picture of the mind emerges from our best psychological theories? This book addresses these philosophical puzzles in a way that is accessible to readers with little or no background in psychology or neuroscience. Using clear and detailed case studies and drawing on up-to-date empirical research, it examines perception and action, the link between attention and consciousness, the modularity of mind, how we understand other minds, and the influence of language on thought, as well as the relationship between mind, brain, body, and world. The result is an integrated and comprehensive overview of much of the architecture of the mind, which will be valuable for both students and specialists in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. | http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-mind-and-language/introduction-philosophy-psychology | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=5 | |
| Anselm on Freedom | Anselm on Freedom | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/4rogers.jpg | Katherin Rogers | Oxford University Press | 2008 | Can human beings be free and responsible if there is a God? Anselm of Canterbury, the first Christian philosopher to propose that human beings have a really robust free will, offers viable answers to questions which have plagued religious people for at least two thousand years: If divine grace cannot be merited and is necessary to save fallen humanity, how can there be any decisive role for individual free choice to play? If God knows today what you are going to choose tomorrow, then when tomorrow comes you have to choose what God foreknew, so how can your choice be free? If human beings must have the option to choose between good and evil in order to be morally responsible, must God be able to choose evil? Anselm answers these questions with a sophisticated theory of free will which defends both human freedom and the sovereignty and goodness of God. | https://global.oup.com/academic/product/anselm-on-freedom-9780199231676?cc=us&lang=en& | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=6 | |
| The Bounds of Cognition | The Bounds of Cognition | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/5adams.jpg | Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa | Oxford Wiley Blackwell | 2008 | An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not.
| http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1405149140.html | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=7 | |
| South Park and Philosophy: Bigger, Longer, and More Penetrating | South Park and Philosophy: Bigger, Longer, and More Penetrating | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/6hanley.jpg | Richard Hanley (editor and contributor) | Open Court | 2007 | Parker and Matt Stone’s long-running Comedy Central hit cartoon South Park has been equally cheered and reviled for its edgy humor, pointed satire of current events and celebrities, and all-around obnoxiousness. But is there more to Kyle, the lonely Jew, Timmy and the Crips, Cartman’s bitchiness, Chef’s inappropriate advice, and Kenny’s continued violent deaths than meets the eye? This collection of essays affirms that possibility. Individual chapters take a sometimes witty, often provocative look at “Is South Park a Libertarian Manifesto?", "That's So Gay!", and "Why Is Cartman Such an Asshole?”. The writers apply classical philosophical analysis to this two-dimensional dystopia, whether in Paul Draper’s “Why Good Things Happen to Bad People — The Problem of Evil in South Park” or Randall Auxier’s “Finding South Park on the Map: Officer Barbrady, Mayor McDaniel, and Chef in Plato’s Republic.” South Park and Philosophy presents new and thoughtful approaches to understanding this surprisingly meaningful show. | http://www.opencourtbooks.com/books_n/south_park.htm | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=8 | |
| Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God | Pascal's Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/7jordan.jpg | Jeff Jordan | Clarendon Press | 2006 | Is it reasonable to believe in God even in the absence of strong evidence that God exists? Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to support belief even if one lacks evidence that theism is more likely than not. Jeff Jordan proposes that there is a sound version of the most well-known argument of this kind, Pascal's Wager, and explores the issues involved - in epistemology, the ethics of belief, decision theory, and theology.
| https://global.oup.com/academic/product/pascals-wager-9780199291328?cc=us&lang=en& | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=10 | |
| Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action | Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Schueler2.jpg | Fred Schueler | Oxford University Press | 2003 | People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons. | https://www.amazon.com/Reasons-Purposes-Rationality-Teleological-Explanation/dp/0199250375/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=reasons+and+purpose%3A+human+rationality&qid=1567695259&s=books&sr=1-1 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=14 | |
| Intuitions as Evidence | Intuitions as Evidence | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/8pust.jpg | Joel Pust | Routledge | 2000 | This volume comprises the unrevised text of Pust's 1997 University of Arizona dissertation in philosophy. In it he considers the nature of intuitions, argues that contemporary philosophy relies on them as evidence, and rebuts empiricist arguments against the use of intuitions as evidence. Special attention is given to the work of Thomas Reid and William Alston. | https://www.routledge.com/products/9781138992658 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=9 | |
| Perfect Being Theology | Perfect Being Theology | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/9rogers.jpg | Katherin Rogers | Edinburgh University Press | 2000 | That being than which a greater cannot be conceived.' This was the way in which the living God of biblical tradition was described by the great Medieval philosophers such as Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. Contemporary philosophers find much to question, criticise and reject in the traditional analysis of that description. Some hold that the attributes traditionally ascribed to God - simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, creativity and goodness - are inherently incoherent individually, or mutually inconsistent. Others argue that the divinity described by philosophers cannot be the same as the providential God of revelation. In Perfect Being Theology Katherin A. Rogers defends the traditional approach, considering contemporary criticisms but concluding that the most adequate account of the nature of God should build upon the foundation laid by the Medieval philosophers. | http://www.euppublishing.com/book/9780748610129 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=11 | |
| Is Data Human?: The Metaphysics of Star Trek | Is Data Human?: The Metaphysics of Star Trek | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/bookhanley.jpg | Richard Hanley | Basic Books | 1998 | Professor Richard Hanley faced the dilemma plaguing so many philosophy professors today—how to entice students into the classroom. Based upon his own successful course, Is Data Human presents a thoroughly unique and enjoyable way of introducing students to the basic concepts of philosophy as seen through the lens of Star Trek. From the nature of a person, of minds, and of consciousness, to ethics and morality, to the nature and extent of knowledge and free will, Hanley brings a fresh perspective to the contemporary debates concerning humankind’s place in the world. Dare to boldly go where no philosophy professor has gone before—a classroom packed with eager and enthusiastic students. | http://www.basicbooks.com/full-details?isbn=9780465045488 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=12 | |
| Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action | Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Schueler1.jpg | Fred Schueler | MIT Press | 1995 | Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. | https://www.amazon.com/Desire-Practical-Reason-Explanation-Bradford/dp/0262528576 | https://www.philosophy.udel.edu/Images Book/Forms/DispForm.aspx?ID=13 | |
